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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court. At issue was the proper standard, and its application, for
determining navigability necessary to exercise federal admiralty
jurisdiction. The court cited the test established by the United States
Supreme Court regarding whether a tort action falls within the federal
courts' admiralty jurisdiction. This two-part test required that "[f]irst, the
alleged tort must have occurred on or over 'navigable waters.' Second, the
activity giving rise to the incident must have had a substantial relationship
to traditional maritime activity such that the incident had a potentially
disruptive influence on maritime commerce." Since the United States
Supreme Court had declared that "pleasure boat accidents have a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity," LeBlanc and Ossen
assigned error only to the district court's definition of "navigable waters."
The court agreed with the district court's use of the basic navigability
test for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction as set forth in the Daniel Ball
case. The test designated those rivers as navigable in fact and in law when
they might be used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce
with other states or foreign countries. The district court found that the part
of the Hudson River where the accident took place was not navigable
because it was disconnected from any interstate or international waterway
by numerous impassable rapids, falls, and artificial dams. LeBlanc and
Ossen did not dispute the applicability of the Daniel Ball test. Instead,
they argued that the test required navigability to be determined by the
waterway's historic, unimproved state, rather than its present, improved
state. If the historic navigability test were applicable, then the logging
industry's regular use of the portion of the river at issue, use which
occurred prior to 1951 and the construction of several impassable dams,
rendered the district court's finding of non-navigability error.
The court rejected LeBlanc and Ossen's argument in light of
subsequent United States Supreme Court case law and the policies served
by federal admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, the court held that a waterway was
"navigable for jurisdictional purposes if it is presently used, or is presently
capable of being used, as an interstate highway for commercial trade or
travel in the customary modes of travel on water. Natural and artificial
obstructions that effectively prohibit such commerce defeat admiralty
jurisdiction." In applying this legal standard, the court found that the
Hudson River at the accident site did not support commercial maritime
activity, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over LeBlanc and
Ossen's claims.
Vanessa L. Condra
United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
Clean Water Act allows the Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers to
delegate authority to issue discharge permits to district engineers in the
Corps).
The United States appealed a judgment by the Northern District of
New York dismissing numerous counts of an indictment. The United
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States brought the indictment pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
against defendants Mango, Austin, Dominske, and Phoenix Environmental,
Inc. (collectively "Mango").
The project at issue involved construction of a natural gas pipeline
running from Ontario, Canada to Long Island, New York. Mango
prepared an economic impact statement ("EIS") pursuant to regulations set
FERC
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC").
approved the project provided that Mango complied with certain conditions
involving stream and wetland construction, mitigation procedures, erosion
control, revegetation, and establishment of a maintenance plan for
disturbed areas. Mango also applied to the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") for a discharge permit pursuant to the CWA. The Corps issued
a discharge permit, signed by Lt. Col. Boston, acting on behalf of Col.
Danielson, the Corp's New York District Engineer. The permit required
Mango to implement the environmental mitigation measures contained in
the FERC permit.
The United States charged Mango with one count of conspiracy to
Counts two through thirty-one alleged
defraud the United States.
"knowing and negligent violations of the permit conditions." The district
court dismissed counts two through thirty-one on the grounds that the
CWA forbade delegation of permit issuing authority to anyone other than
the Chief. The district court indicated that even absent the delegation
problem, it would have dismissed counts eight through thirteen and twentysix through thirty-one because they did not relate to the discharge of dredge
or fill materials into navigable waters.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals first considered the delegation
authority. It stated that by regulation, the Secretary clearly provided for
the delegation of his CWA permitting authority to district engineers and
their designees. The district court had concluded that the delegation was
invalid because the CWA "unambiguously demonstrates that Congress
intended to limit the Secretary's delegation authority to the Chief of the
Engineers." The court relied on principles of statutory construction and
found that if "congressional intent is not clear, we ordinarily will defer to
an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress."
The court of appeals then examined both the statute itself and several
cases interpreting the statute to determine congressional intent. It found
that: (1) the CWA did not specifically address delegation authority; (2) the
case involved internal rather than external subdelegation; (3) there was no
legislative history indicating that Congress expressly rejected
subdelegation; and (4) the overall intent of the CWA was consistent with
authority to subdelegate. Thus, the court held that the phrase "acting
through the Chief of Engineers" did not clearly indicate an intent to
prohibit subdelegation.
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the Secretary reasonably
interpreted the statute to allow for subdelegation. The court held the
Secretary's interpretation reasonable. First, the court stated that Congress
had used the same language in other statutes that contemplated
responsibility for a duty at a level below the Chief's. Second, the
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magnitude of the task of issuing permits suggested that Congress intended
to allow subordinate Corps officials to issue permits and specify permit
conditions. The court noted that the Corps processed approximately
11,000 permits per year, a task too daunting for one person. Finally, the
court stated that "when Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a
longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the
congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by
Congress."
Finally, the court addressed whether the conditions imposed on the
permit were related to the discharge. The court noted that the CWA itself
did not specify how closely the conditions must relate to the discharge.
They held that permit conditions were valid if reasonably related to the
discharge, whether directly or indirectly. From the record, the court could
not determine with certainty whether the conditions adopted from the EIS
are reasonably related to the discharge.
The court held that the Secretary could subdelegate authority to issue
permits to agency officials. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the
case to determine whether the conditions of the permit were reasonably
related to the discharge.
Kimberley Crawford
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Kelly v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, No. 99-2496, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 1786 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 2000) (holding that negligence
or knowledge was not required for civil or administrative penalties for
violations of the Clean Water Act).
Thomas Kelly bought property adjacent to Lake Koshkonong in
Jefferson County, Wisconsin with the intention of turning it into a
subdivision.
A 3.5-acre swale, or low-lying marsh, existed on this
property. As part of the development, Kelly began filling in the swale. In
August 1990, with thirty percent of the swale filled, the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") informed Kelly that he needed a federal permit to
discharge fill material into the swale, and later the Corps mailed him an
application for a permit. Kelly continued to fill the swale because an
attorney advised him that he did not need a permit.
When the Corps returned in September 1990, almost ninety percent of
the swale contained fill material.
The United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") found that Kelly violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by filling a wetland without a permit, and ordered him to
remove the fill and restore the swale to its prior condition. Kelly hired a
friend, Jonathan Prisk, to do some of the work. In January 1994, Kelly
again hired Prisk to dig pits in the swale, bury debris left by the previous
summer's flooding, and level the ground.
Prisk inquired about the

